Another thought on Justice and Care…

The marriage of Justice and Care seems to be a lot older than the 1980’s. In Chapter 11 of Book 8 of his “Nicomachean Ethics” Aristotle examined the relationship between Justice and Friendship and found that where one is absent, the other is usually also absent. “But in the deviation-forms [of government], as justice hardly exists, so too does friendship. It exists least in the worst form; in tyranny there is little or no...

Are Justice and Care two different things?

I really have to wonder whether Justice and Care (reduced to simple labels) are really two separate things, or whether they might be two aspects of the same thing. That is, the use of the term “Justice” when contrasted to “Care” seems narrower than in other applications of the term “Justice”. Now there seems to be a bit of a paradox in reasoning about the differences between Justice and...

Kant, Okin, and Universals

Considering Kant’s morality brings up the question of what is universal, and the implications that result from whether something is or isn’t universal. Kant was strongly oriented towards the universal, and in his Groundwork for the Metaphic of Morals sought to establish a universal principle. Susan Moller Okin claims he has invalidated himself (see my last two postings), ostensibly by the neglect of one factor...

More thoughts on Okin’s “Reason and Fe...

Another thing occurs to me as I consider Okin’s paper. Okin may be idealizing the family relationship and before using that idealized relationship as the basis for criticizing both Kant and Rawls. For example, I described in an earlier posting how the mother love bond may be a fundamental form of love, but it is not the only type of love. Why should this type of love, and only this type of love, invalidate Kant? Okin...

Susan Moller Okin and Empathy vs Reason in Justice

Okin makes a very interesting point when she criticizes John Rawls through Kant for neglecting empathy in determining morality and justice. “The Kantian connection, I suggest, made it extremely difficult for Rawls to acknowledge any role for empathy or benevolence in the formulation of his principles of justice, instead, impelled him in the direction of rational choice” (Okin 231). She sees the root of the...

Kant and Okin

I want to examine the question Susan Moller Okin raises in "Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice" of whether Kant made a fundamental error. In terms of Okin’s theory, “The love of parents for their children, coming to be reciprocated in turn by the child, is important in [John Rawls’] account of the development of a sense of self-worth.” (236) But what if a child is deprived of his...

Reflections on Kant and John Stewart Mill

It’s interesting to read John Stewart Mill. He is very direct and very clear, a refreshing contrast to Kant. Mill had the advantage of writing well after Kant, and being familiar with his work. Mill appears philosophically and temperamentally opposed to Kant. Where Kant wanted to discard all practical and outer considerations and reason his way directly to morality, Mill quickly discards the very approach and goes at...

Can animals possess individual virtue?

I really don’t think virtue can be applied to individual dogs, the key reason being their lack of self-consciousness. While non-human species may have certain rights (a question I don’t really want to get too far into here) I will agree with most traditional thinkers that virtue and morality are not possible to them (Aristotle took this as almost self-evident, going past it rapidly in Book 1, Chapter 13 of his Nicomachean...

Social Justice in Plato and Aristotle

Was either Plato or Aristotle a crusader for social justice? Plato and Aristotle (or any other ancient Greek) were not pursuing “social justice” in the activist sense. Could they respond, they would claim that justice is justice wherever it is to be found, and injustice is injustice in any context, and to look specifically at “social justice” in the sense of activism would be to miss the point....

Are collective moral constructs for the masses an ...

Certainly the statement that collective moral constructs for the masses is an unattainable goal stays true for any attempt to impose morals from outside. However, morality when not imposed, could result in a construct collectively shared by a mass of people. In fact, you could argue that any common culture includes a moral construct shared by a large group of people. The real question then moves to the origin of such...

Philosophical thoughts

I’ve been taking some classes, including an ethics class. The reading has been fascinating, and I was required to write a few things. Some of that seems interesting enough to stand alone, so I’ll be posting it here.

What scientists believe, but can’t prove V

Continuing from The Edge, the fundamental question, what is a human being? Is addressed inadvertently by: DANIEL GILBERT Psychologist, Harvard University In the not too distant future, we will be able to construct artificial systems that give every appearance of consciousness-systems that act like us in every way. These systems will talk, walk, wink, lie, and appear distressed by close elections. They will swear up and down...